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This paper examines whether CEOs with general managerial skills are better at 
achieving the goals of external communication. Using the General Ability Index 
developed by Custodio, Ferreira, and Matos (2013) to measure CEOs' general managerial 
skills, I find that firms with generalist CEOs are more likely to obtain the desired 
outcomes of communication, including the smaller difference between analyst forecasts 
and management guidance, less dispersion in analyst forecasts, higher analyst following, 
and higher institutional ownership, after controlling for CEO talent and the impact of 
Regulation FD. Moreover, I provide direct evidence that general managerial skills are 
more important to external communication under poor information environments. I also 
investigate the characteristics of analysts who follow firms with generalists, and my 
findings suggest the private interaction with analysts is an important communication 
channel for generalists. Finally, I find that generalists are able to attract dedicated 
investors and gain long-term capital for their firms. Overall, I provide evidence on the 
growing importance of general managerial skills in external communication. This paper 
offers new insights into why CEOs with general skills are paid at a premium over those 
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Today’s CEOs face a volatile, increasingly complex business environment 
perhaps than ever before. Rather than simply formulate policies, CEOs are now expected 
to effectively communicate both internally and externally. CEO communication quality 
influences credibility and reputation of their companies because CEO is the link between 
the inside, the organization, and the outside, the stakeholders. Communication, therefore, 
becomes a major function of CEO. For example, Bandiera et al. (2011) follow 94 CEOs 
of top-600 Italian firms over a week and record the time devoted each day to different 
work activities. They find that CEOs spend 60% of their time in meetings and 25% on 
phone calls or at public events. Meanwhile, several extant research documents the 
increased importance of CEO general managerial skills (Custodio, Ferreira, and Matos 
2014; Custodio, Ferreira, and Matos 2013; Cunat and Guadalupe 2009). Thus, it is 
interesting to investigate whether general managerial skills help CEOs to communicate 
better. 
Prior literature suggests that managers have several motivations to communicate 
effectively with outside entities, especially with analysts and institutional investors. Chen 
et al. (2011) find dispersion in analyst forecasts increases after firms stop issuing 
management earnings forecasts and Diether et al. (2002) show dispersion in analyst 
forecasts leads to mispricing of shares. In order to reduce the mispricing, managers have 
an incentive to issue guidance to mitigate analyst forecast dispersion. Increasing analyst 
following is another motivation for managers to communicate effectively with analysts. 
Prior studies show that low analyst following is associated with higher cost of capital 
2 
(Botosan 1997). Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), among others, show firms can decrease 
their cost of capital by increasing disclosure and providing credible information. Prior 
research also suggests that institutional investors actively monitor the performance of the 
firms they invest in thereby generating benefits for the firms (Allen, Bernardo, and Welch 
2000; Gillan and Starks 2000; Fernando, Gatchev, and Spindt 2007). For example, firms 
with a higher concentration of institutional owners profit from a lower cost of capital 
(McConnell and Servaes 1990) and increased liquidity (Boone and White 2014). 
Taking together recent studies on general managerial skills and earlier literature 
on external communication, it is an interesting research topic to investigate whether 
general skills improve communication outside the organization. If general managerial 
skills foster external communication, firms with generalist CEOs are more likely to 
achieve the goals of communication with analysts and investors, such as low dispersion 
in analyst forecasts, high analyst following, or high institutional ownership. Using a panel 
of the CEOs of Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 2,102 firms from 1993 to 2012, I examine 
whether general managerial skills are related to the desired outcomes of external 
communication. Although some prior studies provide evidence on the impact of 
individual managers on firm outcomes using manager fixed effects models (Bertrand and 
Schoar 2003; Bamber et al. 2010; Ge et al. 2011), Demerjian et al. (2012) point out that 
the quantifiable effect of manager fixed effects is limited to managers who switch firms.1 
Therefore, to measure CEOs’ general managerial skills, I use the General Ability Index 
(GAI) developed by Custodio, Ferreira, and Matos (2013). This index includes five 
aspects of a CEO’s professional career: past number of positions, firms, and industries in 
                                                 
1 See Session 5.8 for detailed discussion of the limitations in fixed effects regressions.  
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which a CEO worked; whether the CEO held an executive position at a different 
company; and whether the CEO worked for a conglomerate. GAI is the first factor of the 
principal components analysis of the proxies.  
 I use different measures to proxy for the outcomes of external communication 
with outside entities, especially with analysts and investors. Management earnings 
forecast is an important tool for firms to communicate earnings predictions to market 
participants. Prior studies show that one of management’s incentives is to align market 
expectations with their private information (Kasznik and Lev 1995; Cotter et al. 2006). 
Managers are unlikely to obtain benefits from guiding when market participants do not 
follow the guidance provided (Feng and Koch 2010). Thus, the first measure I use is the 
difference between post-guidance analyst forecasts and management forecasts 
(DIFF_AFMF). I find that this measure is 10% lower for firms with generalists than 
firms with specialists. This is a first indication supporting the proposition that general 
managerial skills can improve external communication because generalist CEOs are 
better at convincing analysts to follow their guidance. 
 As mentioned previously, managers have motivations to reduce analyst forecast 
dispersion and increase analyst following thereby mitigating mispricing and decreasing 
cost of capital. Roulstone (2003) also finds that analyst following is associated with 
increased market liquidity. Therefore, if general skills help CEOs obtain the desired 
outcomes of communication, firms run by generalist CEOs may have significantly less 
forecast dispersion and higher analyst coverage than firms run by specialist CEOs. 
Consistent with the hypothesis, the results show for firms run by generalist CEOs, analyst 
dispersion is 8% lower and an increase of 4 in the number of analyst following. I also 
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find that analysts following firms with generalists tend to cover fewer firms, be less 
experienced, have more time covering and issue more forecasts for the firm. The findings 
are consistent with Soltes (2013), documenting that analysts with these characteristics are 
associated with more private interactions with management.2 
 Given the benefits of institutional shareholdings and the growing importance of 
developing relationships with investors, managers of publicly traded firms spend a 
significant amount of time and efforts meeting institutional investors (Solomon and 
Soltes 2013).3 For example, investor office meetings (i.e. non-deal road show) give firm 
management the opportunity to visit institutional investors. If generalist CEOs are better 
at communicating with investors, their companies will have more institutional ownership 
than those with specialist CEOs. Supporting this hypothesis, the results show institutional 
ownership is 2.2% higher for firms run by generalists. Moreover, using Institutional 
Investor Classification developed by Bushee (1998), I find that generalists are better at 
attracting the "desirable" investors from managers' point of view, the dedicated investors, 
who are able to provide long-term capital for firms.4  
 Next, I offer insights on how general managerial skills improve external 
communication under different information environments. I expect the effect of general 
managerial skills on the outcomes of external communication is stronger in poor 
information environments than in rich information environments. When firms have 
significant information asymmetries, outside entities may more rely on the 
                                                 
2 See Session 5.5 for detailed discussion of the analyst characteristics related to private interactions with 
management.  
3 In 2010, Cross Border Group conducts a global survey on road show practices and finds that on average 
CEOs had meetings with investors on 17 days out of the year. 
4 See Session 5.6 for detailed discussion of the Bushee's institutional investor classification.  
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communication with management for complementing insufficient public information. 
Thus, CEOs have more opportunities to directly contact with analysts and investors, and 
the variation of communication outcomes between generalists and specialists will be 
more pronounced.  Consistent with this prediction, the effect of general managerial skills 
on communication outcomes is stronger for firms with high information asymmetries, 
proxied by the probability of informed trade (PIN), bid-ask spreads, analyst following, 
and institutional ownership. These results provide evidence that general managerial skills 
are even more useful to external communication under poor information environments.  
 Furthermore, to address the concern that GAI captures a CEO's innate talent 
instead of accumulated skills,  I run additional tests using proxies for CEO talent, 
including selectiveness of the CEO's college, job market conditions at the time of 
graduation from college, and Managerial Ability Score developed in Demejian et al. 
(2012). The findings are robust after I control these proxies of innate talent. Hence, it 
implies that generalists are better at external communication because they gain different 
expertise and insights in various career experiences.     
 This paper contributes to and complements extant research in several ways. First, 
this study contributes to the growing literature examining the increased importance of 
CEO general managerial skills under stronger competition (Custodio, Ferreira, and 
Matos 2013; Custodio, Ferreira, and Matos 2014; Hubbard and Palia 1995; Cunat and 
Guadalupe 2009). Also, as CEOs are inevitably involved in companies’ public relations, 
they are expected to communicate effectively with stakeholders (Murphy and Zabojnik 
2007; Ferreira and Sah 2012). My findings support the idea that general managerial skills 
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are more and more critical when external communication becomes an important part of 
business strategy under increasing competition. 
 Second, this paper contributes to several recent papers investigating private 
interactions between investors/analysts and management in various contexts, such as 
private meetings and private phone calls (Soltes 2014; Solomon and Soltes 2013; Brown 
et al. 2014). Private interactions with management continue to occur regularly despite 
restrictions enforced by Reg FD (Soltes 2014). Thomson Reuters Survey of IR Best 
Practices (2009) suggests that 97% of CEOs of publicly traded firms meet privately with 
investors. Also, Brown et al. (2014) find that private communication with management is 
a more useful input to analysts' forecasts than other resources.  During these one-on-one 
meetings, managers will talk to sell-side analysts, mutual fund managers, pension 
managers, or hedge fund managers. While those studies focus on how investors/analysts 
benefit from private interactions with firm management, it is possible that CEOs also 
benefit from direct contact with those stakeholders. For example, extant studies find that 
CEOs are compensated if they have greater connections to mutual fund managers (Butler 
and Gurun 2012). Thus, general managerial skills may play a role in building up the 
connections between CEOs and investors/analysts, thereby achieving the desired 
outcomes of external communication. 
 Third, this study complements upper echelons literature which finds that 
individual managerial characteristics play a fundamental role in corporate strategic 
choices (Hambrick and Mason 1984; Jensen and Zajac 2004; Carpenter et al. 2004; 
Hambrick 2007; Bamber et al. 2010 ). Specifically, Bamber et al. (2010) document that 
demographic characteristics of manager personal backgrounds affect financial disclosure 
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styles: managers from finance and accounting and those with military experience favor 
more precise disclosure choices. I complement this literature by showing managers’ 
lifetime work experience exerts unique and significant influence on external 
communication. My study is different from Bamber et al. (2010) in at least two aspects: 
(1) They focus on managers’ personal demographic characteristics, including whether 
managers have accounting/finance or legal background, are born before or after World 
War II, have military experience, and have an M.B.A. degree. In contrast, I examine the 
accumulated expertise that managers obtain throughout their lifetime work experience. In 
the beginning, two managers may share the same personal demographic backgrounds. 
But as they held different positions at different firms and industries, each develops his 
own expertise and managerial ability. Therefore, accumulated managerial skills are more 
likely to play a significant role in external communication than former personal 
backgrounds. (2) Bamber et al. (2010) focus on traditional voluntary disclosure measures, 
such as forecast frequency, accuracy, precision, news, and bias. By constrast, I 
investigate whether general skills help managers achieve the goals of external 
communication by measuring the real effects of communication, including analyst 
following, dispersion in analyst forecasts, and institutional ownership.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the hypothesis 
and research methodology is discussed in Section 3. Section 4 describes sample selection, 
data, and descriptive statistics and empirical results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 
summarizes and concludes the paper. 
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CHAPTER 2 
RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Upper echelons theory 
 Hambrick and Mason's (1984) upper echelons theory suggests that there is a close 
association between corporate elites' strategy preferences and their observable managerial 
characteristics, such as age, formal education, functional areas, career experience, 
socioeconomic background, and financial position. This line of literature indicates that 
idiosyncratic differences in managers' experience are related to differences in personal 
cognitive bases and values, which in turn determine their strategic choices (Wiersema 
and Bantel 1992; Jensen and Zajac 2004; Carpenter et al. 2004). For example, Bamber et 
al. (2010) find that individual top managers exert economically significant individual-
specific influence over five aspects of management forecasts: frequency, precision, news, 
bias, and accuracy.  Thus, the theory states that different outcomes and performance 
levels in organizations, such as profitability, growth, and survival, are partially predicted 
by managerial background characteristics (Hambrick and Mason 1984).  
 Among these observable managerial characteristics proposed by the upper 
echelons theory, functional areas and career experience are directly related to managers' 
work experience, which in turn affects the accumulated managerial skills. Hambrick and 
Mason (1984) point out that although the chief executives are presumed to adopt a 
company-wide perspective, they carry an orientation developed from work experience in 
some primary functional areas. For example, Dearborn and Simon (1958) documented 
that a group of managers from different functional areas were presented with the same 
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case study and required to think the problem from a company-wide view. These 
managers, however, interpreted it mainly as the operations and goals of their own areas. 
  In addition to functional areas, career experience may also significantly affect the 
strategic choices taken by managers. Hambrick and Mason (1984) suggest managers 
develop their cognitive bases through the experience managers have had during their 
careers. If  managers have spend their entire careers in  one  organization, they are 
assumed to have relatively limited perspective and restricted knowledge base when faced 
with an unprecedented problem, such as deregulation, increasing competition, or a 
technological shift. Managers' career experience, therefore, shapes the lenses through 
which they view and understand strategic opportunities and problems (p.200).  
 While Hambrick and Mason's (1984) upper echelons theory predicts that career 
experience may have significant influence on corporate strategic choices and 
performance levels, existing research mainly focuses on the effect of managers' 
demographic characteristics or their functional backgrounds (Smith and White 1987; 
Thomas et al. 1991; Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Jensen and Zajac 2004; Bamber et al. 
2010). Thus, this study contributes beyond this line of literature by investigating how the 
lifetime career experience plays a role in external communication outcomes, and provides 
empirical evidence on the effect of managers' career experience, as predicted in upper 
echelons theory.  
  
2.2 CEO lifetime work experience: general versus firm-specific managerial skills 
 CEOs accumulate managerial skills throughout their lifetime work experience. 
Becker (1962) classifies managerial capital into two categories: (1) general human 
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capital, which is not specific to any organization and is transferable across firms or 
industries; (2) firm-specific human capital, which is useful only within an organization. 
Recent studies show the importance of general human capital is increasing over the past 
decades. Murphy and Zabojnik (2004, 2007) point out general managerial ability recently 
becomes more valuable than firm-specific skills. They find that increases in external 
CEO hiring and executive compensation are related to the growing demand for general 
skills. Custodio, Ferreira, and Matos (2013) also provide empirical evidence showing pay 
is higher for CEOs with general skills. In addition to executive compensation, recent 
studies investigate how general managerial ability is associated with the productivity of a 
firm’s research activities. Custodio, Ferreira, and Matos (2014) show that firms with 
CEOs that gather general managerial skills during their lifetime work experience produce 
more innovation. 
 
2.3 CEO ability versus CEO general managerial skill 
 It is important to distinguish between CEO ability and CEO general managerial 
skill. As mentioned above, general managerial skill refers to general human capital 
accumulated throughout managers' lifetime work experience. In contrast, the term CEO 
ability, or talent5, usually refers to a measure of CEO performance in the economics, 
finance, or management literatures.  For example, Fee and Hadlock (2003) use industry-
adjusted stock returns as a proxy for managerial talent and find that top executives in 
firms with high returns are more likely to be hired away and receive higher wages at their 
new firm. Milbourn (2003) uses media coverage, CEO tenure, and appointment from 
                                                 
5 According to Merriam-Webster dictionary, the word "talent" means a special ability that allows someone 
to do something well.  
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outside of the firm as proxies for CEO ability. Rejgopal et al. (2006) use future return and 
future ROA to proxy for managerial talent. Similarly, Demejian et al. (2012) develop a 
measure of managerial ability based on managers' efficiency in transforming corporate 
resources to revenues. This line of literature uses different measures to proxy for CEO 
talent, and all these measures have been shown to be highly correlated with firm 
performance (Demejian et al. 2012; Demejian et al. 2013). On the other hand, higher 
general managerial skill may not be necessarily related to better firm performance. 
Custodio, Ferreira, and Matos (2013) find a statistically insignificant relation between the 
index of general managerial skill and accounting or stock market performance, such as 
net profit margin, ROE, stock return, and Tobin's q. Moreover, Babenko, Custodio, and 
Mariano (2014) show that specialists perform better than generalists in smaller and more 
focused conglomerates. 
 In summary, this study is intrinsically different from extant CEO talent literature, 
which usually examines whether more able managers are associated with better firm 
performance. Instead, this study shows whether the lifetime work experience affects CEO 
communication with outside entities, especially under different information environments.  
  
2.4 Communication and general managerial skills 
 Communication is the transmission of meaning from one person to another or to 
many people, whether verbally or non-verbally (Barrett 2006). Dewatripont and Tirole 
(2005) develop a theory of communication. They posit that one obstacle to effective 
communication is a sender fails to consider a receiver’s knowledge, such as absorptive 
capacity. The sender should spend time, efforts, and other resources so as to 
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communicate his knowledge effectively. Also, the sender needs to covey the relevant 
information, instead of redundant or irrelevant information, in order not to discourage the 
receiver’s absorption. Conversely, the receiver has to understand the acquired 
information, decode the literal meaning, and make corresponding decisions. 
Communication involves two parties, one who transmits and one who receives the 
message. In other words, communication includes disclosure and absorption of 
information.  
 Corporate disclosure has always been an important research area in accounting 
and finance literature. Healy and Palepu (2001) review the current empirical disclosure 
studies, and analyze determinants and economic consequences of corporate disclosure. 
They point out three sources of disclosure: (1) required disclosure, including the financial 
statements, footnotes, management discussion and analysis, and other regulatory filings; 
(2) voluntary disclosure, such as management forecasts, conference calls, press releases, 
and other corporate reports; (3) other disclosures made by information intermediaries, 
including financial analysts, industry experts, and the financial press. Managers can 
communicate with investors and analysts through the first two channels.  
 Considering the fact that managers spend most of their day engaged in 
communication (Bandiera et al. 2011), it underscores how important strong 
communication skills can be for managers desiring to advance in their organization. 
Ferreira and Sah (2012) develop a model in which managers with general skills are likely 
to occupy the top of an organization as the complexity of the business environment 
increases and communication technologies improve. Their analysis shows that managers 
with broader expertise can understand better the information provided by subordinates 
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with different expertise. Thus, CEOs with general skills are more likely to oversee 
companies’ numerous activities effectively, allowing them to communicate better in 
various situations. Moreover, as mentioned previously, communication includes 
disclosure and absorption of information. To communicate effectively, CEOs must take 
into account receivers’ absorptive capacity and help receivers understand the message. 
Thus, it takes efforts and resources to convey relevant information to the audience. 
Generalist CEOs accumulate different expertise throughout their work experience in 
different positions and industries. It is possible that generalist CEOs are better at 
providing message according to audiences’ absorptive capability, thus encouraging the 
information absorption. 
 Extant literature has documented various benefits of good communication with 
investors and analysts. Management voluntary disclosure has been shown to reduce 
information asymmetry among informed and uninformed investors, thereby enhancing 
stock liquidity and increasing institutional ownership (Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; 
Verrecchia 2001; Easley and O’Hara 2004). Furthermore, firms with more informative 
disclosures have higher analyst coverage and less dispersion in analyst forecasts 
(Baginski et al. 1993; Clement et al. 2003). Feng and Koch (2010) also document that 
managers are less likely to obtain benefits from issuing guidance when market 
participants do not follow their guidance. In other words, the extent to which post-
guidance analyst forecasts deviate from management earnings guidance is associated with 
benefits of communication with analysts. Taken together, if general managerial skills 
improve communication outside the organization, firms with generalist CEOs are more 
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likely to benefit from effective communication compared to firms with specialist CEOs. 
Accordingly, I make the following hypothesis: 
 H1: General managerial skills are associated with the degree to which CEOs 
obtain the desired outcomes of external communication. 
 Moreover, I expect the effect of general managerial skills on the outcomes of 
external communication is stronger in poor information environments than in rich 
information environments. When firms have weak public information environments  and 
significant information asymmetries, outside entities may more rely on the 
communication with management for complementing insufficient public information. 
Analysts and institutional investors may want to gather firm-specific information directly 
from management. If that is the case, then CEOs have more opportunities to directly 
contact with analysts and investors. The variation of communication outcomes between 
generalists and specialists, therefore, will be more pronounced.  In contrast, under rich 
information environments, outside entities are able to obtain information from other 
sources rather than from contacts with management. Fewer interactions between 
managers and outside entities may lead to a smaller effect of general managerial skills on 
communication outcomes. Thus, I make the following hypothesis: 
 H2: The effect of CEO general managerial skills on the outcomes of external 






3.1 Measuring general managerial skills 
 I apply the General Ability Index (GAI) developed by Custodio, Ferreira, and 
Matos (2013) to measure general managerial skills. This index measures a CEO’s general 
human capital accumulated during his/her lifetime work experience in publicly traded 
firms prior to the current CEO position. Therefore, GAI captures the ability not specific to 
any organization but transferable across firms or industries. Custodio et al. (2013) include 
five proxies of general managerial skills. (1) Number of positions: the number of 
different positions that a CEO held during his career. Different positions are related to 
multiple organizational areas, including marketing, sales, human resources, and finance. 
(2) Number of firms: the number of firms where a CEO worked. (3) Number of industries: 
the number of industries at four-digit SIC where a CEO worked. (4) CEO experience 
dummy: a dummy variable that equals one if a CEO held a CEO position at another firm. 
A CEO position requires generic skill set to handle customers, media, or company 
stakeholders. (5) Conglomerate experience dummy: a dummy variable that equals one if 
a CEO worked for a multi-division firm. 
 To combine these variables into one–dimensional index of general managerial 
ability, Custodio et al. (2013) use principal component analysis to extract common 
components from these five proxies. This index is standardized to have zero mean and a 
standard deviation of one. Higher GAI means higher general managerial skills. 
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3.2 Measuring the effect of general managerial skills on outcomes of external 
communication 
 I examine four measures to proxy for the effects of better external communication. 
As discussed above, most prior studies rely on management earnings forecast as a proxy 
for voluntary disclosure. If general managerial skills improve external communication, 
generalist CEOs may be better at convincing analysts to follow their guidance. Therefore, 
the first measure I use is the difference between post-guidance analyst forecasts and 
management guidance. Following Feng and Koch (2010), I define DIFF_AFMF it,q as the 
absolute value of the difference between management guidance for quarter q in year t and 
the analyst consensus forecast for that quarter as of ten days after the release of the 
management guidance, scaled by share price of firm i at the end of quarter q−1. 
Hypothesis 1 is tested using DIFF_AFMFit, an average of DIFF_AFMF it,q over each 
quarter in year t. This variable is highly positively skewed (with skewness of 3.63) so I 
take a logarithmic transformation of DIFF_AFMFit and conduct the analysis using log-
transformed values.6 I estimate the effect of general managerial skills on the difference 
between analyst forecasts and management guidance using a regression model of the 
following form: 
  Ln(DIFF_AFMFit) = αit + β GAIit + γXit + εit   (1) 
                                                 
6 To assure that the p-values for the t-tests are valid, linear regression requires that residuals be normally 
distributed (i.e. normality of residuals assumption). A common cause of non-normally distributed residuals 
is non-normally distributed predictor variables. To deal with skewed variables, prior studies usually take a 
logarithmic transformation and conduct the analysis using log-transformed values (Eisenbeis 1977; 
Introduction to SAS. UCLA: Statistical Consulting Group from http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/sas/notes2/). 
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where i indexes firm and t indexes time. Hypothesis 1 predicts a negative and significant 
coefficient on β as generalist CEOs are better at convincing analysts to follow their 
guidance. 
  Control variables are denoted by the vector X, which are identified in previous 
studies as potential determinants of the difference between analyst forecasts and 
management guidance. Following Feng and Koch (2010), I control for management 
forecast error, which is positively related to DIFF_AFMFit.  I include the number of 
analyst following as prior studies show analyst following and disclosure quality are 
correlated (Lang and Lundholm 1993). Several firm characteristics also have an influence 
on disclosure quality. Firms with poor performance (Chen et al. 2011; Miller 2002), low 
transparency and liquidity (Lang et al. 2012; Bhattacharya et al. 2013), small size 
(Kasznik and Lev 1995), and high proprietary costs (Bamber and Cheon 1998) are more 
likely to have lower disclosure quality. Therefore, I include the additional control 
variables Sales, Leverage, Market-to-Book, ROA, Size, Cash, CAPEX, R&D, and Firm 
Age.  
 The second measure of communication outcome is dispersion in analyst forecasts. 
I follow Feng and Koch (2010) and define DISPit,q as the standard deviation of analysts’ 
forecasts for quarter q in year t, scaled by share price of firm i at the end of quarter q-1. 
Hypothesis 1 is tested using DISPit, an average of DISPit,q over each quarter. DISPit is 
log-transformed to reduce potential problems resulting from its highly skewed 
distribution, with skewness equal to 3.61. To estimate the effect of general managerial 
skills on the dispersion in analyst forecasts, I use a regression model of the following 
form: 
18 
   Ln(DISPit) = αit + β GAIit + γXit + εit                        (2) 
where i indexes firm and t indexes time. Hypothesis 1 predicts a  negative and significant 
coefficient on β as generalist CEOs are better at reducing analyst forecast dispersion, 
thereby decreasing mispricing of shares. Prior studies document that cross-sectional 
variation in dispersion is induced by firm-level characteristics such as uncertainty in the 
analysts' information environments and difference in opinion. Consistent with Liu and 
Natarajan (2012), Model 2 includes the number of analysts as proxies for difference in 
opinion. To capture the uncertainty in information environments, I include Loss, R&D, 
Leverage, ROA, Cash, CAPEX, Market-to-Book, and Firm Age.  
 One of the most important goals for managers is to reduce the cost of capital. If 
generalist CEOs are better at communicating, they are more likely to achieving this goal 
through external communication with entities outside the organization. Prior studies 
document that lower cost of capital are associated with more analyst following and higher 
institutional ownership, which thus are the third and fourth proxy for the desired 
outcomes of communication. To estimate the effect of general managerial skills on the 
number of analysts, I use a regression model of the following form: 
   ANALYSTit = αit + β GAIit + γXit + εit                   (3) 
where i indexes firm and t indexes time. I define analyst following (ANALYSTit) as the 
average number of analysts following firm i as of the beginning of the quarter for all 
quarters in year t. Hypothesis 1 predicts a positive and significant coefficient on β as 
generalist CEOs are better at increasing analyst following. Model 3 includes several 
control variables that prior research suggests are associated with analyst coverage. 
Diether et al. (2002) predict that turnover in the firm's shares are positively related to 
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analyst coverage, so I include Turnover and Change in Turnover in the regression. 
Consistent with Liu and Natarajan (2012) and Lundholm et al. (2012), I include BETA 
and Market-to-Book to capture the fundamental risk of firms; R&D, Leverage, ROA, 
Cash, CAPEX and Firm Age capture the demand for analyst services.  
 To estimate the effect of general managerial skills on institutional ownership, I 
use a regression model of the following form: 
    IORit = αit + β GAIit + γXit + εit                   (4) 
where the dependent variable institutional ownership (IORit) is shares held by 
institutional investors as a fraction of shares outstanding in year t. Hypothesis 1 predicts a  
positive and significant coefficient on β as generalist CEOs are better at increasing 
institutional ownership. Graves and Waddock (1994) document that firm profitability, 
size, and leverage are determinants of  institutional ownership; thus, Sales and ROA are 
included to proxy for profitability and expected to positively related to IORit. In addition, 
Market-to-Book, R&D, Cash, CAPEX and Firm Age are intended to capture the 
uncertainty in information environments (Liu and Natarajan 2012).  
 
3.3 Measuring the effect of general managerial skills on outcomes of external 
communication in poor and rich information environments 
 To test Hypothesis 2, I use four measures to proxy for poor or rich information 
environments based on prior literature. Following Brown and Hillegeist (2007), I use the 
probability of informed trade (PIN) as a proxy for information environments. The PIN is 
a firm-specific estimate of the probability that a trade originates from a privately 
informed investor. Accordingly, it captures the extent of information asymmetry among 
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investors in the secondary market. Brown and Hillegeist (2007) compute the PIN using 
the Venter and de Jong model (2004), extension of the EKO model (Easley, Kiefer, and 
O'Hara 1997), measured over the annual period beginning 8 months before the firm's 
fiscal year end and expressed as a percentage. I define firms are in poor (rich) 
information environments if their PINs are above (below) the yearly median. Hypothesis 
2 predicts that the impact of general managerial skills on communication outcomes will 
be stronger in the high PIN group than in the low PIN group. In other words, firms run by 
generalists will have a smaller difference between analyst forecasts and management 
guidance, less analyst forecast dispersion, more analyst coverage and institutional 
ownership under poor information enviorments. 
 The second measure of information environments is bid-ask spreads. Following 
Lang et al. (2012), this variable is calculated as the median bid-ask spreads over the fiscal 
year, where the bid-ask spreads are calculated as (ASK−BID)/((ASK+BID)/2).  I define 
firms are in poor (rich) information environments if their bid-ask spreads are above 
(below) the yearly median. Furthermore, consistent with Bhattacharya et al. (2013) and 
Bushee et al. (2010), I use analyst following and institutional ownership as other proxies 
for information environments. Firms are in poor (rich) information environments if their 
analyst following and institutional ownership are below (above) the yearly median. 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the effect of general managerial skills on communication 
outcomes will be stronger in high bid-ask spread, low analyst following, or low 
institutional ownership group.   
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA, SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION, AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 Using the GAI developed by Custodio, Ferreira, and Matos (2013), my sample 
consists of a panel of CEO-firm-years in the 1993-2012 period of Standard and Poor’s 
(S&P) 2,102 firms drawn from the EXECUCOMP database. Custodio, Ferreira, and 
Matos (2013) manually match the executives in EXECUCOMP who are identified as 
CEOs in each year with the BoardEx database to obtain information for prior professional 
experience. They then match firms in BoardEx to Compustat (US firms) and Datastream 
(international firms) to obtain the standard industrial classification (SIC) of firms where 
CEOs worked. They use information on all of CEOs’ past positions, including those in 
non-S&P firms, and create GAI to measure the generality of CEOs’ human capital, with 
financial firms and utilities excluded. 
 I use the First Call Company Issued Guidelines (CIG) file to measure quarterly 
management earnings guidance, and I/B/E/S to measure analyst forecasts. I control for 
firm characteristics using accounting data from Compustat, stock returns data from CRSP, 
and institutional ownership data from the Thomson CDA/Spectrum 13F Holdings. 
Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix A. The sample consists of 20,513 
CEO-firm-year observations between 1993 and 2012. Table 1 Panel A presents the 
summary statistics for communication ability measures, disclosure choices, CEO 
characteristics, and firm characteristics. Variables are winsorized at 1% level in both tails. 
Panel B shows 25% of firms are run by generalists, 32% of firms are run by specialists 
and 43% of firms are run by generalists or specialists in different periods. Panel C shows 
42% of CEOs are classified as generalists in the whole sample period, 44% of CEOs are 
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classified as specialists, and 14% of CEOs are classified as both generalists and 
specialists in different periods. I further investigate the 14% of CEOs, 546 CEOs, who 
are classified as both types in Panel D.  Panel D1 presents the initial status of these 546 
CEOs: 15% of them are initially classified as generalists and change to specialists later; 
85% of them are initially classified as specialists and then change to generalists. Panel D2 
shows the number of status change of these 546 CEOs: 85% of them change once, 10% 
of them change twice, and only 5% of them change more than twice.      
 Table 2 examines the determinants of generalist CEOs using a probit regression 
model. CEOs with general skills are more likely to be older, hired from outside the firm, 
have a shorter tenure, obtain a MBA degree, and also to be chair of the board. In terms of 
firm characteristics, firms run by generalists are more likely to be larger, have more sales 
and R&D, and are more diversified with higher cash holdings. 
 Table 3 Panel A compares the means of communication ability measures between 
generalist CEOs and specialist CEOs. A generalist CEO is defined as a top executive who 
has a GAI above the median in a given year. As shown in the table, compared to firms 
with specialist CEOs, those with generalists have a smaller difference between post-
guidance analyst forecasts and management guidance, more analyst coverage, and higher 
institutional ownership. Hence, in terms of the outcomes of external communication, the 
univariate tests suggest firms run by generalist CEOs are better at achieving the goals of 
communication. Panel B compares the means of disclosure choices between generalist 
CEOs and specialist CEOs. The univariate tests suggest that generalists tend to provide 




5.1 General managerial skills and the outcomes of external communication 
 Table 4 presents the tests of whether general managerial skills affect the 
difference between analyst forecasts and management guidance. The specification is an 
ordinary least squares panel regression including year fixed effect, and the t-statistics are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity using clustered standard errors. Column 1 shows that the 
coefficient on GAI is negative and significant. A one standard deviation increase in GAI 
is related to a decrease of 4% in the difference between analyst forecasts and 
management guidance. Column 2 shows the results with the alternative measure GAI 
dummy, a value equal to one for CEO-year observations with an index above the yearly 
median and zero otherwise. I find that DIFF_AFMF is 10% lower for generalists than 
specialists. Therefore, consistent with H1, firms run by generalists are better at 
convincing analysts to follow their guidance. Similar with prior studies, management 
forecast error is positively associated with DIFF_AFMF, showing that less accurate 
management guidance is related to different opinion between managers and analysts. 
Also, consistent with literature, small firm size and high proprietary costs, measured by 
Market-to-Book, are negatively associated with DIFF_AFMF (Kasznik and Lev 1995; 
Bamber and Cheon 1998).  
 Table 5 reports the relation between dispersion in analyst forecasts and general 
managerial skills. Column 1 shows a one standard deviation increase in GAI is related to 
a decrease of 3.6% in analyst forecast dispersion. Using GAI dummy to classify, I find 
DISP is 8% lower for generalist CEOs. Hence, the results support H1 that firms run by 
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generalist CEOs have significantly less forecast dispersion compared to firms run by 
specialist CEOs. In addition, Liu and Natarajan (2012) document that cross-sectional 
variation in dispersion is induced by firm-level characteristics such as uncertainty in the 
analysts' information environments. Similar with prior literature, I find that firms with 
losses and more leverage have higher dispersion. Also, the levels of cash holding and 
R&D are positively associated with forecast dispersion.  
 Then I examine the effect of GAI on analyst following. Table 6 column 1 shows a 
one standard deviation increase in GAI is related to an increase of 4 in the number of 
analyst following. Column 2 shows similar results that firms run by generalist CEOs have 
more analyst coverage than firms run by specialist CEOs. As expected, these results 
provide evidence that firms run by generalists are better at attracting analysts to follow 
their firms. Moreover, consistent with Diether et al. (2002), I find high turnover in the 
firm's shares  are positively related to analyst coverage; CAPEX and R&D, which 
increases the demand for analyst services, are positively associated with analyst coverage 
(Lundholm et al. 2012). 
 Table 7 presents the regression of institutional ownership on general managerial 
skills. Column 1 reports that GAI is positively linked with institutional ownership and 
column 2 shows IOR is 2.2% higher for firms with generalist CEOs. Thus, this finding 
indicates generalist CEOs also have the abilities to attract more institutional investors. 
Consistent with prior studies, institutional investors tend to hold stocks of firms which are 
larger and more profitable. Overall, the results of Table 4 to 7 provide strong empirical 
evidence support Hypothesis 1 that general managerial skills play an important role in the 
outcomes of external communication.  
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5.2 General managerial skills and the outcomes of external communication in 
different information environments  
 To test Hypothesis 2, I use four measures to proxy for poor or rich information 
environments: PIN, bid-ask spreads, analyst following, and institutional ownership. Table 
8 presents results for the sample split into high and low PIN group based on PIN above or 
below the yearly median. Consistent with the prediction, Panel A and C show a 
significant coefficient on GAI dummy only in firms with high PIN, a measure of high 
information asymmetry. Panel D indicates that generalist CEOs attract more investors in 
poor information environments than in rich ones. 
 Table 9 presents results for the sample split into high and low bid-ask spread 
group based on firms’ spreads above or below the yearly median. Consistent with Table 8, 
Panel A to C show firms in high bid-ask spread groups have a significant coefficient on 
GAI dummy. Similarly, panel D indicates generalist CEO can attract more institutional 
ownership when their firms have higher bid-ask spreads. Therefore, these results 
demonstrate that general managerial skills are even more useful under poor information 
environments.  
 Table 10 reports results for high and low analyst following group. Panel A, B, and 
D indicate that in low analyst following environments, firms run by generalists have less 
difference between analyst forecasts and manager guidance, less dispersion in analyst 
forecasts, and more institutional investors. Likewise, Table 11 presents results for high 
and low institutional ownership group. Panel A to C all show that in low institutional 
ownership environments, firms with generalists have less difference between analyst 
forecasts and manager guidance, less dispersion in analyst forecasts, and more analyst 
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following. Overall, these findings are consistent with the prediction that general 
managerial skills have a stronger effect on external communication outcomes in poor 
information environments than in rich information environments. 
 
5.3 General managerial skills versus talent 
 As discussed in Session 2, general managerial skills refer to general human 
capital accumulated throughout managers' lifetime work experience, while talent usually 
is a measure of CEO performance. To address the concern that GAI captures a CEO's 
innate talent instead of accumulated skills, I run additional tests using three proxies for 
CEO talent. The first measure is Ivy League Dummy, a variable that takes a value of one 
if the CEO attended an Ivy League school at any academic level. Custodio, Ferreira, and 
Matos (2013) point out managers who started their career under tougher labor market 
conditions should be more talented than other managers. Thus, the second proxy is 
Recession Graduate Dummy, a variable that takes a value of one if the CEO first 
academic degree was awarded in a National Bureau of Economic Research recession year. 
The third proxy is Managerial Ability Score developed in Demejian et al. (2012), a 
measure of managers' efficiency in transforming corporate resources to revenues. It is the 
residual from a regression of total firm efficiency that controls for firm features beyond 
CEO talent.  
 Table 12 reports results controlling for Ivy League Dummy and Recession 
Graduate Dummy. The signs and magnitudes are generally similar to the baseline 
regressions. Hence, my findings hold after control for innate talent. Likewise, Table 13 
presents results controlling for Managerial Ability Score. The coefficients on GAI dummy 
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are all significant in Panel A to D. Overall, these results show that GAI does not just 
capture talent but it measures CEOs’ lifetime work experience. Generalists are better at 
external communication because they gain different expertise and insight in various 
career experiences.  
 
5.4 General managerial skills and disclosure choices 
 I now consider how general skills affect voluntary disclosure choices. While the 
univariate tests show generalists tend to issue more accurate forecasts and hold more 
conference calls, the results may be driven by other firm factors rather than general skills.  
Table 14 presents regressions of disclosure choices on general skills. Following prior 
studies, I control for analyst following, litigation risk, and other firm characteristics that 
are related to management voluntary disclosure.  Column 1 and 2 show an insignificant 
relation between forecast errors and general managerial skills. At first glance, the results 
might be somewhat surprising. However, since I find that generalists are able to achieve 
the desired outcomes of communication especially in poor information environments, 
where information asymmetry is high. It implies that generalists' communication skills 
may be more qualitative than quantitative and that generalist CEOs use some other means 
of communication rather than quarterly earnings forecasts. Consistent with this idea, I do 
not find generalist CEOs issue more quarterly management guidance or conference calls 
when compared with specialist CEOs. These results imply there is not much variation 
between generalist CEOs and specialist CEOs in terms of public interactions with 
analysts. The findings are consistent with Soltes (2014), which documents that publicly 
available events only capture a small amount of interactions between managers and 
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analysts. In addition, column 7 and 8 show that firms with generalists issue less bad news 
guidance than specialists. This finding contradicts with the common belief that credible 
bad news disclosures from managers will gain more trust from analysts. Overall, the 
results indicate the traditional disclosure measures are insufficient to capture the 
communication ability of generalist CEOs.   
 
5.5 What type of analysts follow firms run by generalists? 
 As shown in Table 6, there is a strong difference in the number of analysts 
between firms with generalists and with specialists. It is interesting to know what type of 
analysts follow firms run by generalists. Moreover, Soltes (2013) documents that analysts 
with certain characteristics are associated with more private interactions with 
management. He finds analysts covering fewer firms, spending more time in covering the 
firm, less experienced, and exerting more effort are likely to interact privately with 
managers (p.255).  Also, as discussed in Session 5.3, publicly available events only 
capture a small amount of interactions between managers and analysts so public 
interactions with analysts cannot provide sufficient evidence for the communication 
ability of generalists. Therefore, to test the idea that private interaction is an important 
communication channel for generalists, I follow Soltes (2013) and examine these analyst 
characteristics: Frequency of Forecasts is the number of earning forecasts issued by an 
analyst in each year; Number of Firms Covered is the number of firms for which an 
analyst issues quarterly earnings forecasts in each year; Years as Analyst measures the 
length of time an analyst is included on the I/B/E/S database; Years Covering Firm 
measures the length of time for which an analyst has issued earning forecasts on a firm in 
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each year; Broker Size is the number of analysts employed in a brokerage house in each 
year.  
  Panel A of Table 15 shows the summary statistics of these analyst characteristics. 
Analysts who follow firms with generalists, on average, issue 10.26 forecasts per year, 
cover 16.6 firms per year, have 7.96 years of work experience and have followed the 
firms for 4.52 years. Panel B examines what type of analysts are more likely to cover 
firms run by generalists. As the number of forecasts an analyst made is used as a proxy 
for an analyst's effort (Mayew 2008), analysts following firms with generalists exert more 
effort than those following firms with specialists. Also, analysts following firms with 
generalists tend to cover fewer firms, be less experienced, have more time covering the 
firm, and work in a larger broker house. These results are consistent with what Soltes 
(2013) finds: (1) meeting privately with managers requires more effort on the part of the 
analyst; (2) analysts covering more firms will be less likely to meet privately with 
managers due to constraints on their time; (3) less experienced analysts seek to gain 
additional economics and institutional information through interactions with managers; (4) 
it takes time to develop a relationship with senior management team at a specific firm so 
analysts covering the firm for longer periods of time are more likely to interact privately; 
(5) analysts working at a larger and prestigious broker house have the ability to access 
significant investors for the firm, which attracts managers to speak with the analysts to 
obtain these relationships. Taken together, these findings provide evidence that generalist 




5.6 What type of institutions hold the stocks of firms run by generalists? 
 As shown in Table 7, firms with generalists have higher institutional ownership 
than firms with specialists. Prior studies document that institutional investors are not a 
homogeneous group and differ greatly in terms of investment styles, trading frequency, 
competitive pressures, and legal restrictions, all affecting their sensitivity to the short-
term performance of their portfolio companies (Potter 1992; Bushee 2001; Bushee 2004).  
Therefore, it is important to know what type of institutions hold the stocks of firms run 
by generalists. Also, are these investors desirable from managers' point of view so that 
managers seek to increase their institutional ownership? 
 Bushee (1998) classifies institutional investors into three categories based on their 
trading behavior: (1) Transient investors, which exhibit high portfolio turnover and own 
small stakes in portfolio companies. Transient investors tend to be short-term-focused 
investors whose interest in the firm's stock is based on the likelihood of short-term 
trading profits, thus increasing stock volatility of firms.  (2) Dedicated investors, which 
provide stable ownership and take large positions in individual firms. Dedicated 
institutions have extremely low turnover, consistent with a relationship investing role and 
a commitment to provide long-term capital (Porter 1992; Dobrzynski 1993). (3) Quasi-
indexers, which also trade infrequently but own small stakes. Quasi-indexers tend to have 
diversified holdings, consistent with a passive, buy-and-hold strategy of investing 
portfolio funds in a broad set of firms (Porter 1992). Moreover, Bushee (2004) finds that 
transient investors are attracted to companies with investor relations activities geared 
toward forward-looking information and news events, like management forecasts and 
conference calls, which constitute trading opportunities for such investors. In contrast, 
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quasi-indexers and dedicated institutions are largely insensitive to short-term 
performance and their presence is associated with lower stock price volatility. Bushee 
(2004) further points out that since quasi-indexers and dedicated investors are generally 
not looking to trade in the short term, management forecasts of quarterly earnings and 
other timely disclosures are relatively unimportant to them (p.29). In summary, firms 
usually seek to attract more dedicated investors to establish a investment commitment for 
long-term capital but are less likely to attract transient investors who would increase 
stock price volatility.  
 I obtain institutional ownership data from the Thomson CDA/Spectrum 13F 
Holdings and Institutional Investor Classification Data from Bushee's website.7 For 
institutional investors who are not included in Bushee's classification, I classify them as 
"other" type. Panel A of Table 16 reports the summary statistics of institutional 
ownership for firms with generalists and specialists. For firms run by generalists, on 
average, quasi-indexers account for 42.9% of shareholdings, transient investors account 
for 17.5%, and dedicated investors account for 10.1%.  Since my previous results show 
firms with generalists have higher institutional ownership, I expect that generalists are 
better at attracting dedicated investors rather than transient investors. Consistent with this 
prediction, Panel B indicates that dedicated investors are more likely to hold stocks of 
firms with generalists and transient investors are not likely to do so. Overall, these 
findings suggest the communication ability of generalists is useful to attract dedicated 
investors and gain long-term capital for their firms.  
 
                                                 
7 http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html 
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5.7 Effect of Regulation FD  
 The SEC implemented Regulation Fair Disclosure (i.e., Reg FD) in October 2000, 
prohibiting firms privately disclosing material information to select groups of market 
participants without simultaneously disclosing the same information to the public. 
Despite this regulation, analysts and investors continue to covet private interactions with 
management (Soltes 2013; Brown et al. 2014; Solomon and Soltes 2013). Brown et al. 
(2014) find that information analysts obtain privately from management can become 
useful within the context of other information the analysts already possess. Similarly, 
Solomon and Soltes (2013) document that some investors are able to acquire information 
from private meetings with management, and this information is useful in improving their 
trading decisions. While these findings do not provide direct evidence of violations of 
Reg FD, they show that private conversations between management and outside entities 
are prevalent in the post-Reg FD environment. Therefore, generalists still can contact 
with analysts and investors through the off-line interactions to achieve the desired 
outcomes of communication after Reg FD.  
 As the effective date of Reg FD is in the fourth quarter of 2000, I define 1993 to 
2000 as the pre-Reg FD period, and 2001 to 2013 as the post-Reg FD period. Table 17 
shows before Reg FD, the difference between analyst forecasts and management 
guidance, analyst forecast dispersion, and institutional ownership are significantly 
different between generalists and specialists. After Reg FD, firms with generalists have a 
smaller difference between analyst forecasts and management guidance, more analyst 
coverage, and more institutional ownership than firms with specialists. These findings are 
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consistent with the prediction that generalists are able to achieve better communication 
outcomes even in the post-Reg FD environment. 
 
5.8 Fixed effects regressions 
 While it has become very common to include fixed effects models in empirical 
studies, the decision of whether or not to employ fixed effects models depends on the 
goal of that research. Graham et al. (2012) point out one of the major caveats of the fixed 
effects model (p.165): fixed effects regressions measure only within-individual 
differences and discard between-individual differences. Hence, if independent variables 
vary greatly across individuals but have little variation over time for each individual, then 
fixed effects models wipe out the variation of interest. For example, Hermalin and 
Weisback (1991) do not apply the firm fixed effects approach when examining the effect 
of managerial ownership on firm value because the primary factor determining the results 
is between-firm variation.  
 Bearing in mind this caveat, I now examine CEO and firm fixed effects panel 
regressions. Custodio, Ferreira, and Matos (2013) mention that in the CEO fixed effects 
regression, the coefficient of the GAI dummy captures only the difference in  the 
dependent variable for CEOs who change from specialists to generalists or vice versa 
(p.479). But in my sample, as shown in Table 1 Panel C, 86% of CEOs are classified as 
either generalists or specialists during the entire period. Moreover, for the remaining 14% 
of CEOs who switch between specialists and generalists, 85% of them change just once 
(Panel D2), indicating GAI dummy does not have much variation over time for the same 
CEO. Therefore, CEO fixed effects approach, which capture only within-CEO variation, 
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may not be suitable in my setting. Similarly, firm fixed effects models examine only the 
within-firm variation and absorb the between-firm variation (Graham et al. 2012, p.162). 
But in reality it is uncommon for a firm to replace its CEO so frequently that GAI dummy 
would have much variation over time for the same firm. Hence, I do not expect the results 
of fixed effects models must be consistent with the hypothesis. Table 18, 19, 20 and 21 
report regressions of CEO and firm fixed effects models. After including CEO fixed 
effects, the difference between analyst forecasts and management guidance, analyst 
coverage, and institutional ownership are significantly different between generalists and 
specialists; after including firm fixed effects, the difference between analyst forecasts and 
management guidance remains significant.  
 
5.9 Effect of product market competition  
 Prior studies document that general managerial skills become more important in 
increased product market competition due to industry deregulation or foreign competition 
(Cunat and Guadalupe 2009). Accordingly, I expect that the effect of general managerial 
skills on communication outcomes will be pronounced under stronger market competition. 
Table 22 presents results for the sample split into high and low Industry Sale Herfindahl 
group based on the index above or below the yearly median. Consistent with the 
prediction, Panel A and C show a significant coefficient on GAI dummy only in firms 
with high Herfindahl index. Also, Panel D indicates that generalist CEOs attract more 





 This paper examines whether CEOs with general managerial skills are better at 
achieving the goals of external communication. I apply the General Ability Index 
developed by Custodio, Ferreira, and Matos (2013) to measure CEOs’ general managerial 
skills. Using a panel of the CEOs of Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 2,102 firms from 1993 to 
2012, I find that firms with generalist CEOs are more likely to obtain the desired 
outcomes of communication, including a smaller difference between analyst forecasts 
and management guidance, less dispersion in analyst forecasts, higher analyst following, 
and higher institutional ownership, even after controlling for CEO talent and the impact 
of Reg FD. Moreover, I show that the effect of general managerial skills on 
communication outcomes is stronger for firms with high information asymmetries. These 
results provide direct evidence that general managerial skills are more useful to external 
communication in poor information environments.  I also investigate the characteristics 
of analysts who follow firms with generalists, and my findings are consistent with the 
recent studies examining the private interactions between firm management and analysts. 
Finally, I find that generalists are able to attract dedicated investors and gain long-term 
capital for their firms.  
 Overall, I provide evidence of the growing importance of general managerial 
skills in external communication. The skills gathered through work experience have 
significant explanatory power for CEO communication outcomes. This paper offers new 
insights into why CEOs with general skills are paid at a premium over those with specific 
skills, as documented in previous studies.
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DIFF_AFMF Average of the absolute difference between management 
quarterly forecasts and analyst consensus forecasts after 
management forecasts in year t, scaled by stock price at the 
beginning of the quarter (First Call; I/B/E/S). 
DISP Average of analyst forecast dispersion at the beginning of each 
quarter in year t, scaled by stock price at the beginning of the 
quarter (I/B/E/S).  
ANALYST Average of the number of analyst following the firm at the 
beginning of each quarter in year t (I/B/E/S). 
IOR Shares held by institutional investors as a fraction of shares 
outstanding (Thomson CDA/Spectrum 13F Holdings). 
CEO Characteristics   
General Ability Index First factor of applying principal components analysis to five 
proxies of general managerial ability: past Number of 
Positions, Number of Firms, Number of Industries, CEO 
Experience Dummy, and Conglomerate Experience Dummy 
(BoardEx). 
General Ability Index Dummy Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the CEO’s general 
ability index is above the yearly median, and zero otherwise 
(BoardEx). 
CEO Tenure Number of years as CEO in the current position (BoardEx). 
CEO Age Age of CEO in years (BoardEx). 
External Hire Dummy Dummy variable that takes a value of one if CEO was hired 
from outside the firm, and zero otherwise (BoardEx). 
MBA Dummy Dummy variable that takes a value of one if CEO has a MBA 
degree, and zero otherwise (BoardEx). 
CEO-Chair Dummy Dummy variable that takes a value of one if CEO is also chair 
of the board, and zero otherwise (BoardEx). 
Ivy League Dummy Dummy variable that takes a value of one if CEO attended an 
Ivy League school (Brown University, Columbia University, 
Cornell University, Dartmouth College, Harvard University, 
Princeton University, University of Pennsylvania, and Yale 
University) at any academic level and zero otherwise 
(BoardEx). 
Recession Graduate Dummy Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the CEO 
graduated (first academic degree) in a National Bureau of 
Economics Research recession year and zero otherwise 
(BoardEx). 
Managerial Ability Score The score is developed by Demerjian et al. (2011), the residual 
from the second stage estimation of firm efficiency, 




Industry Sales Herfindahl Herfindahl index calculated as the sum of squared market 
shares of firms’ sales (Compustat SALE) at the two-digit SIC 
industry level. 
Firm Characteristics   
Sales Sales in thousands of dollars (Compustat SALE). 
Leverage Total debt, defined as debt in current liabilities plus long-term 
debt, divided by total assets (Compustat (DLC + DLTT) / AT). 
Market to Book Assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity 
divided by assets (Compustat (AT + CSHO*PRCC_F - CEQ) / 
AT)). 
ROA Earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets 
(Compustat EBIT / AT). 
Size Log value of total assets (Compustat AT). 
Diversification Dummy Dummy variable that takes a value of one if a firm has more 
than one business segment, and zero otherwise (Compustat). 
Stock Return Annual stock return (Compustat (PRCC_F(t) / AJEX(t) + 
DVPSX_F(t) / AJEX(t)) / (PRCC_F(t-1) / AJEX_F(t-1))). 
Loss Percentage of quarters with losses (Compustat). 
Litigation  Dummy variable that takes a value of one if a firm is in the 
biotechnology, computer, electronics, or retailing sector, and 
zero otherwise (Compustat). 
Cash Cash and short-term investments divided by total assets 
(Compustat CHE / AT). 
CAPEX Capital expenditures divided by total assets (CAPX / AT). 
Firm Age Number of years since a firm listed its shares (CRSP). 
R&D Research and development expenses divided by total assets 
(Compustat XRD / AT). 
Beta The slope of CAPM model (CRSP). 
Turnover The average share turnover in a stock and is defined as shares 
traded divided by shares outstanding (CRSP). 
Change in Turnover Turnover in year t minus Turnover in year t-1 (CRSP). 
PIN The probability of informed trade 
(http://scholar.rhsmith.umd.edu/sbrown/pin-data) .  
Bid-ask Spreads The median bid-ask spreads over the fiscal year, where the 
bid-ask spreads are calculated as (ASK−BID)/((ASK+BID)/2 
(CRSP). 
Disclosure variables   
Management Forecast  Error Average of the absolute management forecast errors in year t, 
scaled by stock price at the beginning of the quarter (First 
Call). 
Number of Quarterly Guidance Number of earnings forecasts for one to four quarters in year t 
(First Call). 
Number of Quarterly 
Conference Call 
Number of earnings conference calls in year t 
(http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/feng/). 
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Badnews Guidance Frequency Number of management bad earnings forecasts divided by the 
total number of management earnings forecasts in year t. Bad 
earnings forecasts are management forecasts below the prior 




Table 1 Summary statistics 
Panel A presents the median, mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum for each 
variable. Panel B reports firms run by generalists, specialists, or both in sample period. Panel C 
presents CEOs classified as generalists, specialists, or both in sample period. Panel D reports the 
initial status and status change for those CEOs classified as both in sample period. The sample 
consists of EXECUCOMP firms for which CEO profile data are available from BoardEx in the 
1993-2012 period. Financial and utility firms are omitted. All variables are winsorized at the 1st 
and 99th percentile values.  
 






Communication ability measures      
DIFF_AFMF -6.067 -6.152 1.307 -10.442 -2.790 
DISP -6.753 -6.765 1.095 -9.142 -3.844 
ANALYST 53.000 64.739 46.308 8.000 218.000 
IOR 0.705 0.690 0.149 0.238 1.045 
Disclosure choices      
Management Forecast  Error -6.171 -6.215 1.147 -8.685 -2.864 
Number of Quarterly Guidance 3.000 2.884 1.074 1.000 4.000 
Number of Quarterly Conference Call 2.000 1.775 0.811 1.000 5.000 
CEO characteristics      
General Ability Index 0.200 0.255 0.947 -1.519 2.658 
CEO Tenure 5.000 6.217 4.373 1.000 23.000 
CEO Age 55.500 55.326 6.306 40.000 72.000 
External Hire Dummy 0.000 0.304 0.462 0.000 1.000 
MBA Dummy 0.000 0.348 0.478 0.000 1.000 
CEO-Chair Dummy 1.000 0.681 0.468 0.000 1.000 
Ivy League Dummy 0.000 0.232 0.424 0.000 1.000 
Recession Graduate Dummy 0.000 0.384 0.488 0.000 1.000 
Managerial Ability Score -0.003 0.000 0.113 -0.306 0.320 
Firm characteristics      
Sales 8.044 8.017 1.191 5.069 12.457 
Leverage 0.242 0.241 0.126 0.000 0.569 
Market to Book 1.721 2.027 1.030 0.916 7.678 
ROA 0.098 0.100 0.070 -0.157 0.361 
Size 8.017 8.029 1.144 5.119 11.127 
Cash 0.076 0.106 0.108 0.001 0.537 
CAPEX 0.034 0.045 0.035 0.006 0.199 
Firm Age 31.000 30.167 21.528 2.000 79.000 
R&D 0.009 0.025 0.039 0.000 0.271 
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Beta 3.000 3.428 1.708 1.000 7.000 
Turnover 1.282 1.457 0.929 0.364 8.176 
Change in Turnover 0.024 -0.074 1.210 -13.353 1.532 
Loss 0.000 0.121 0.250 0.000 1.000 
Litigation 0.000 0.297 0.459 0.000 1.000 
 
Panel B: Firms         
  Number of firms Percentage Number of firm-years Percentage 
Firms run by generalists 528 25% 3,926 19% 
Firms run by specialists 671 32% 4,795 23% 
Firms run by generalists  
and specialists  
903 43% 11,792 57% 
Total 2,102 100% 20,513 100% 
 
Panel C: CEOs     
  Number of CEOs Percentage 
CEOs classified as generalists only 1,629 42% 
CEOs classified as specialists only  1,700 44% 
CEOs classified as both generalists and specialists 546 14% 
Total 3,875 100% 
 
Panel D1: CEO classified as both generalists and specialists: initial status 
Initial status Number of CEOs Percentage 
Generalists  84 15% 
Specialists  462 85% 
Total 546 100% 
 
Panel D2: CEO classified as both generalists and specialists: status change 
Number of status change Number of CEOs Percentage 
1 463 85% 
2 56 10% 
3 11 2% 
4 9 2% 
5 7 1% 
Total 546 100% 
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Table 2 The determinants of generalist CEOs 
This table examines the determinants of generalist CEOs using a probit regression model. GAI 
dummy is a variable equal to one if a CEO has a General Ability Index above the median in a 
given year. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
  GAI Dummy 
CEO Tenure -0.032*** 
[-18.608] 
CEO Age 0.032*** 
[18.634] 
External Hire Dummy 0.378*** 
[16.115] 
MBA Dummy 0.377*** 
[15.575] 












Diversification Dummy 0.163*** 
[6.504] 













Pseudo R2 0.117 
Table 3 Univariate tests 
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Panel A presents the means of communication ability measures and Panel B presents the means 
of disclosure choices for the sample of generalist CEOs (those with General Ability Index above 
the yearly median) and specialist CEOs (those with General Ability Index above the yearly 
median), the associated difference, and its t-statistic. Variable definitions are provided in the 
Appendix A. 
 
Panel A       
Communication ability measures Generalists Specialists Difference t-statistic 
DIFF_AFMF -5.886 -5.701 -0.184 -3.39 
DISP -6.573 -6.485 -0.065 -1.87 
ANALYST 64.267 55.086 9.267 11.98 
IOR 0.677 0.653 0.026 8.48 
 
 
Panel B       
Disclosure choices Generalists Specialists Difference t-statistic 
Management Forecast  Error -6.361 -6.310 -0.129 -3.6 
Number of Quarterly Guidance 3.041 3.073 -0.043 -1.15 




Table 4 General managerial skills and the difference between analyst forecasts and 
management forecasts 
 
This table presents the tests of whether general managerial skills affect the difference between 
analyst forecasts and management guidance. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix A. 
Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** 








































Table 5 General managerial skills and dispersion in analyst forecasts 
 
This table presents the tests of whether general managerial skills affect dispersion in analyst 
forecasts. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix A. Robust t-statistics adjusted for 
firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 




































Table 6 General managerial skills and the number of analyst following 
 
This table presents the tests of whether general managerial skills affect the number of analyst 
following. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix A. Robust t-statistics adjusted for 
firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 





































Table 7 General managerial skills and institutional ownership 
 
This table presents the tests of whether general managerial skills affect institutional ownership. 
Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix A. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level 




































Table 8 Different information environments measured by PIN 
 
This table presents the tests of general managerial skills and the outcomes of external 
communication in different information environments, measured by PIN. High and low PIN 
groups consist of firms whose PINs are above or below the yearly median. In Panel A, the 
dependent variable is difference between analyst forecasts and manager forecasts. In Panel B, the 
dependent variable is dispersion in analyst forecasts.  
 
  
Panel A Panel B
High PIN Low PIN High PIN Low PIN
DIFF_AFMF DIFF_AFMF DISP DISP
GAI Dummy -0.207*** -0.003 GAI Dummy -0.087 -0.068
[-2.815] [-0.037] [-1.589] [-1.278]
 Management Forecast Error 0.477*** 0.595*** Analyst -0.002** -0.001
[15.405] [20.520] [-2.187] [-1.488]
Analyst 0.002* 0.003*** Loss 1.768*** 1.731***
[1.947] [3.070] [15.133] [13.700]
Sales 0.128* 0.095 Leverage 0.383** 0.161
[1.895] [1.414] [2.197] [0.868]
Leverage 0.185 0.372 Market to Book -0.337*** -0.378***
[0.678] [1.458] [-9.227] [-14.983]
Market to Book -0.080* -0.121*** ROA -2.010*** -0.434
[-1.879] [-4.309] [-3.726] [-1.000]
ROA -2.450*** -0.977** Cash 0.929*** 0.898***
[-3.917] [-2.127] [4.518] [3.290]
Size -0.242*** -0.217*** Capex 1.344** 0.962
[-3.149] [-2.660] [2.124] [1.528]
Cash -0.309 0.358 R&D 0.772 1.714**
[-0.994] [1.334] [1.130] [2.341]
Capex -0.488 -0.281 Firm Age 0.005*** 0.002
[-0.597] [-0.380] [3.253] [1.535]
Firm Age 0.002 0.002 Intercept -6.593*** -6.761***
[1.134] [1.128] [-13.358] [-17.813]









Table 8 Different information environments measured by PIN  
In Panel C, the dependent variable is dispersion in analyst following. In Panel D, the dependent 
variable is institutional ownership. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix A. Robust t-
statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 




Panel C Panel D
High PIN Low PIN High PIN Low PIN
ANALYST ANALYST IOR IOR
GAI Dummy 3.177** 2.958 GAI Dummy 0.029*** 0.014**
[1.987] [1.232] [3.923] [2.135]
Beta -0.111 0.390 Sales -0.006 -0.008
[-0.337] [0.916] [-0.733] [-1.123]
Turnover 11.039*** 6.602*** Leverage 0.031 0.067**
[7.948] [5.024] [1.054] [2.396]
Change in Turnover -3.662*** -2.963** Market to Book -0.004 -0.013***
[-3.510] [-2.250] [-0.984] [-4.683]
Leverage 14.659** 6.685 ROA 0.483*** 0.296***
[2.439] [0.733] [9.651] [6.230]
Market to Book 5.860*** 7.580*** Size 0.040*** -0.005
[3.954] [5.876] [5.112] [-0.670]
ROA 17.378 -53.384*** Cash 0.020 0.020
[1.103] [-2.604] [0.678] [0.767]
Cash -10.622 32.731** Capex 0.136** 0.044
[-0.940] [2.055] [2.028] [0.682]
Capex 94.582*** 205.154*** R&D 0.061 -0.017
[4.380] [5.659] [0.635] [-0.202]
R&D 126.209*** 224.666*** Firm Age -0.001*** -0.001***
[3.124] [4.369] [-4.639] [-4.093]
Firm Age 0.185*** 0.092 Intercept 0.224*** 0.621***
[3.504] [1.369] [7.267] [17.924]









Table 9 Different information environments measured by bid-ask spreads 
 
This table presents the tests of general managerial skills and the outcomes of external 
communication in different information environments, measured by bid-ask spreads. High and 
low bid-ask spread groups consist of firms whose bid-ask spreads are above or below the yearly 
median. In Panel A, the dependent variable is difference between analyst forecasts and manager 
forecasts. In Panel B, the dependent variable is dispersion in analyst forecasts. Variable 
definitions are provided in the Appendix A. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering 






Panel A Panel B
High Bid-ask Spread Low Bid-ask Spread High Bid-ask Spread Low Bid-ask Spread 
DIFF_AFMF DIFF_AFMF DISP DISP
GAI Dummy -0.204** -0.017 GAI Dummy -0.117** -0.058
[-2.583] [-0.250] [-2.241] [-0.989]
 Management Forecast Error 0.447*** 0.613*** Analyst -0.002*** -0.000
[14.275] [20.257] [-2.865] [-0.692]
Analyst 0.004*** 0.002** Loss 1.690*** 1.662***
[3.811] [2.102] [15.707] [11.537]
Sales 0.150** 0.085 Leverage 0.279 0.148
[2.099] [1.319] [1.608] [0.767]
Leverage 0.297 0.274 Market to Book -0.296*** -0.371***
[1.072] [1.060] [-7.679] [-13.855]
Market to Book -0.140** -0.108*** ROA -1.969*** -0.567
[-2.445] [-4.026] [-4.179] [-1.176]
ROA -2.840*** -0.675 Cash 0.751*** 1.029***
[-4.606] [-1.497] [3.723] [3.563]
Size -0.306*** -0.183** Capex 0.803 1.546**
[-3.875] [-2.312] [1.317] [2.351]
Cash -0.207 0.347 R&D 0.666 1.837**
[-0.547] [1.394] [1.149] [2.287]
Capex -1.155 -0.017 Firm Age 0.003** 0.003*
[-1.214] [-0.026] [2.280] [1.897]
Firm Age 0.002 0.002 Intercept -5.821*** -7.266***
[0.875] [0.967] [-61.057] [-11.346]











Table 9 Different information environments measured by bid-ask spreads 
In Panel C, the dependent variable is dispersion in analyst following. In Panel D, the dependent 
variable is institutional ownership.  Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix A. Robust 
t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 




Panel C Panel D
High Bid-ask Spread Low Bid-ask Spread High Bid-ask Spread Low Bid-ask Spread 
ANALYST ANALYST IOR IOR
GAI Dummy 3.274** 2.375 GAI Dummy 0.031*** 0.013**
[1.980] [1.013] [3.840] [1.982]
Beta -1.588*** -0.004 Sales -0.003 -0.008
[-4.940] [-0.009] [-0.324] [-1.112]
Turnover 12.660*** 6.216*** Leverage -0.005 0.100***
[10.682] [3.885] [-0.168] [3.610]
Change in Turnover -5.320*** -2.403*** Market to Book -0.008 -0.008***
[-7.683] [-2.733] [-1.619] [-2.885]
Leverage 13.459** -3.144 ROA 0.486*** 0.161***
[2.022] [-0.344] [9.769] [3.507]
Market to Book 6.079*** 6.326*** Size 0.049*** -0.017**
[4.008] [4.561] [5.813] [-2.312]
ROA -11.110 -63.430*** Cash 0.037 0.008
[-0.612] [-2.759] [1.110] [0.329]
Cash 1.027 27.852* Capex 0.187*** -0.018
[0.083] [1.675] [2.704] [-0.258]
Capex 105.822*** 194.106*** R&D 0.060 -0.057
[4.998] [4.846] [0.566] [-0.724]
R&D 150.578*** 205.888*** Firm Age -0.001*** -0.001***
[3.339] [3.706] [-3.129] [-3.332]
Firm Age 0.070 0.145** Intercept 0.133*** 0.748***
[1.286] [2.166] [4.074] [25.802]








Table 10 Different information environments measured by analyst following 
 
This table presents the tests of general managerial skills and the outcomes of external 
communication in different information environments, measured by analyst following. High and 
low analyst following groups consist of firms whose analyst following is above or below the 
yearly median. In Panel A, the dependent variable is difference between analyst forecasts and 
manager forecasts. In Panel B, the dependent variable is dispersion in analyst forecasts. Variable 
definitions are provided in the Appendix A. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering 





Panel A Panel B
High Analyst Following Low Analyst Following High Analyst Following Low Analyst Following
DIFF_AFMF DIFF_AFMF DISP DISP
GAI Dummy -0.047 -0.157** GAI Dummy -0.020 -0.157***
[-0.661] [-2.075] [-0.348] [-2.949]
 Management Forecast Error 0.596*** 0.472*** Analyst -0.001** -0.008***
[22.105] [13.843] [-2.081] [-4.400]
Analyst 0.002** 0.008*** Loss 1.744*** 1.804***
[2.162] [2.981] [14.132] [14.359]
Sales 0.097 0.150* Leverage 0.209 0.340*
[1.584] [1.909] [1.216] [1.727]
Leverage 0.183 0.435 Market to Book -0.396*** -0.308***
[0.699] [1.581] [-15.412] [-7.134]
Market to Book -0.125*** -0.092* ROA -0.512 -2.284***
[-4.894] [-1.932] [-1.195] [-3.701]
ROA -1.010*** -2.271*** Cash 0.964*** 0.789***
[-2.704] [-3.057] [3.633] [3.449]
Size -0.198*** -0.311*** Capex 0.937 1.251*
[-2.752] [-3.521] [1.537] [1.756]
Cash 0.431* -0.398 R&D 1.813** -0.153
[1.689] [-1.121] [2.479] [-0.205]
Capex -0.451 -0.572 Firm Age 0.003* 0.001
[-0.655] [-0.643] [1.861] [0.740]
Firm Age 0.003 0.002 Intercept -5.939*** -7.394***
[1.382] [0.909] [-54.177] [-13.713]











Table 10 Different information environments measured by analyst following 
In Panel C, the dependent variable is institutional ownership.  Variable definitions are provided in 
the Appendix A. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 11 Different information environments measured by institutional ownership 
 
This table presents the tests of general managerial skills and the outcomes of external 
communication in different information environments, measured by institutional ownership. High 
and low institutional ownership groups consist of firms whose institutional ownership is above or 
below the yearly median. In Panel A, the dependent variable is difference between analyst 
forecasts and manager forecasts. In Panel B, the dependent variable is dispersion in analyst 
forecasts. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix A. Robust t-statistics adjusted for 
firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 





Panel A Panel B
High IOR Low IOR High IOR Low IOR
DIFF_AFMF DIFF_AFMF DISP DISP
GAI Dummy 0.007 -0.197*** GAI Dummy -0.034 -0.134**
[0.092] [-2.958] [-0.698] [-2.026]
 Management Forecast Error 0.554*** 0.539*** Analyst -0.001 -0.003***
[17.423] [18.212] [-1.343] [-3.689]
Analyst 0.003*** 0.003*** Loss 1.823*** 1.801***
[3.013] [2.779] [16.656] [12.656]
Sales 0.151** 0.086 Leverage 0.243 0.234
[2.025] [1.274] [1.492] [1.060]
Leverage 0.195 0.389 Market to Book -0.392*** -0.354***
[0.692] [1.555] [-13.380] [-10.956]
Market to Book -0.098** -0.121*** ROA -0.543 -1.328**
[-2.141] [-4.166] [-1.193] [-2.432]
ROA -1.499* -1.362*** Cash 1.010*** 0.756**
[-1.877] [-3.339] [5.492] [1.994]
Size -0.274*** -0.183** Capex 0.714 1.394*
[-3.206] [-2.487] [1.311] [1.837]
Cash 0.347 0.068 R&D 1.073 1.312*
[1.034] [0.268] [1.533] [1.768]
Capex -0.645 -0.307 Firm Age 0.003* 0.002
[-0.828] [-0.398] [1.744] [1.050]
Firm Age -0.000 0.003* Intercept -6.307*** -6.544***
[-0.018] [1.768] [-30.170] [-13.610]











Table 11 Different information environments measured by institutional ownership 
In Panel C, the dependent variable is analyst following.  Variable definitions are provided in the 
Appendix A. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, 




High IOR Low IOR
ANALYST ANALYST





























Table 12 General managerial skills and talent measured by Ivy League Dummy and 
Recession Graduate Dummy  
This table presents the tests of general managerial skills and the outcomes of external 
communication controlling for Ivy League Dummy and Recession Graduate Dummy. In Panel A, 
the dependent variable is difference between analyst and manager forecasts. In Panel B, the 
dependent variable is dispersion in analyst forecasts. Variable definitions are provided in the 
Appendix A. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
  
Panel A Panel B
OLS OLS OLS OLS
DIFF_AFMF DIFF_AFMF DISP DISP
GAI -0.043* GAI -0.033
[-1.743] [-1.603]
GAI Dummy -0.106** GAI Dummy -0.075*
[-2.029] [-1.720]
 Management Forecast Error 0.542*** 0.542*** Analyst -0.002*** -0.002***
[23.983] [23.991] [-3.336] [-3.292]
Analyst 0.003*** 0.003*** Loss 1.811*** 1.810***
[3.922] [4.044] [19.581] [19.560]
Sales 0.125** 0.126** Leverage 0.235* 0.237*
[2.452] [2.456] [1.678] [1.694]
Leverage 0.289 0.302 Market to Book -0.371*** -0.372***
[1.500] [1.571] [-16.147] [-16.142]
Market to Book -0.114*** -0.115*** ROA -1.015*** -1.027***
[-4.648] [-4.674] [-2.761] [-2.788]
ROA -1.420*** -1.425*** Cash 0.919*** 0.924***
[-3.729] [-3.748] [4.657] [4.670]
Size -0.235*** -0.238*** Capex 0.943* 0.939*
[-4.115] [-4.141] [1.897] [1.888]
Cash 0.181 0.181 Firm Age 1.158** 1.136**
[0.855] [0.849] [2.035] [2.008]
Capex -0.398 -0.427 R&D 0.002* 0.002*
[-0.701] [-0.750] [1.814] [1.815]
Firm Age 0.002 0.002 Ivy League Dummy -0.057 -0.056
[1.383] [1.433] [-1.029] [-1.008]
R&D 0.095 0.075 Recession Graduate Dummy -0.009 -0.011
[0.182] [0.145] [-0.201] [-0.241]
Ivy League Dummy 0.061 0.060 Intercept -6.580*** -6.614***
[0.920] [0.898] [-13.874] [-13.786]









Table 12 General managerial skills and talent measured by Ivy League Dummy and 
Recession Graduate Dummy  
In Panel C, the dependent variable is dispersion in analyst following. In Panel D, the dependent 
variable is institutional ownership.  Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix A. Robust 
t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 




Panel C Panel D
OLS OLS OLS OLS
ANALYST ANALYST IOR IOR
GAI 3.786*** GAI 0.011***
[3.607] [3.574]
GAI Dummy 3.917** GAI Dummy 0.022***
[2.133] [3.658]
Beta -0.004 -0.012 Sales -0.010 -0.009
[-0.011] [-0.035] [-1.454] [-1.416]
Turnover 9.592*** 9.499*** Leverage 0.050** 0.050**
[7.196] [7.164] [2.079] [2.056]
Change in Turnover -3.686*** -3.643*** Market to Book -0.007*** -0.007***
[-3.541] [-3.499] [-2.580] [-2.593]
Leverage 12.298* 11.625* ROA 0.438*** 0.439***
[1.792] [1.688] [10.740] [10.769]
Market to Book 7.163*** 7.104*** Size 0.027*** 0.027***
[6.217] [6.292] [4.220] [4.157]
ROA 8.932 9.977 Cash 0.031 0.030
[0.523] [0.592] [1.296] [1.259]
Cash 6.491 6.665 Capex 0.117** 0.119**
[0.482] [0.500] [1.997] [2.029]
Capex 149.444*** 151.565*** R&D 0.015 0.018
[5.410] [5.484] [0.190] [0.227]
R&D 208.142*** 204.818*** Firm Age -0.001*** -0.001***
[4.626] [4.580] [-5.742] [-5.771]
Firm Age 0.221*** 0.207*** Ivy League Dummy 0.001 0.000
[3.781] [3.507] [0.082] [0.027]
Ivy League Dummy 0.900 0.395 Recession Graduate Dummy 0.013** 0.013**
[0.354] [0.157] [1.970] [2.001]
Recession Graduate Dummy 3.150 3.137 Intercept 0.348*** 0.362***
[1.552] [1.563] [13.261] [13.718]









Table 13 General managerial skills and talent measured by Managerial Ability 
Score developed in Demejian et al. (2012) 
This table presents the tests of general managerial skills and the outcomes of external 
communication controlling for Managerial Ability Score developed in Demejian et al. (2012). In 
Panel A, the dependent variable is difference between analyst and manager forecasts. In Panel B, 
the dependent variable is dispersion in analyst forecasts. Variable definitions are provided in the 
Appendix A. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, 






Panel A Panel B
OLS OLS OLS OLS
DIFF_AFMF DIFF_AFMF DISP DISP
GAI -0.039 GAI -0.033
[-1.547] [-1.596]
GAI Dummy -0.110** GAI Dummy -0.082*
[-2.107] [-1.916]
 Management Forecast Error 0.545*** 0.545*** Analyst -0.002*** -0.002***
[24.034] [24.092] [-3.246] [-3.221]
Analyst 0.003*** 0.003*** Loss 1.821*** 1.822***
[3.939] [4.028] [19.746] [19.732]
Sales 0.123** 0.128** Leverage 0.232* 0.232*
[2.451] [2.553] [1.652] [1.647]
Leverage 0.313* 0.326* Market to Book -0.378*** -0.379***
[1.657] [1.734] [-16.502] [-16.496]
Market to Book -0.112*** -0.113*** ROA -1.134*** -1.141***
[-4.516] [-4.550] [-3.065] [-3.076]
ROA -1.627*** -1.665*** Cash 0.956*** 0.962***
[-4.221] [-4.305] [4.906] [4.922]
Size -0.230*** -0.236*** Capex 1.048** 1.051**
[-4.011] [-4.112] [2.102] [2.108]
Cash 0.222 0.218 R&D 1.138** 1.111**
[1.079] [1.052] [2.020] [1.986]
Capex -0.309 -0.339 Firm Age 0.003** 0.003*
[-0.547] [-0.599] [1.978] [1.958]
Firm Age 0.002 0.003 Managerial Ability Score 0.321* 0.318*
[1.622] [1.645] [1.776] [1.755]
R&D 0.086 0.080 Intercept -6.569*** -6.604***
[0.165] [0.155] [-13.579] [-13.470]











Table 13 General managerial skills and talent measured by Managerial Ability 
Score developed in Demejian et al. (2012) 
In Panel C, the dependent variable is analyst following. In Panel D, the dependent variable is 
institutional ownership.  Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix A. Robust t-statistics 
adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance 




Panel C Panel D
OLS OLS OLS OLS
ANALYST ANALYST IOR IOR
GAI 3.845*** GAI 0.012***
[3.658] [3.585]
GAI Dummy 3.994** GAI Dummy 0.022***
[2.149] [3.677]
Beta -0.085 -0.098 Sales -0.011 -0.010
[-0.259] [-0.300] [-1.606] [-1.559]
Turnover 9.493*** 9.391*** Leverage 0.046* 0.046*
[7.221] [7.191] [1.906] [1.880]
Change in Turnover -3.486*** -3.438*** Market to Book -0.007** -0.007**
[-3.539] [-3.498] [-2.450] [-2.451]
Leverage 11.342* 10.677 ROA 0.409*** 0.410***
[1.652] [1.551] [9.414] [9.434]
Market to Book 7.352*** 7.300*** Size 0.030*** 0.029***
[6.347] [6.439] [4.631] [4.549]
ROA 7.376 7.985 Cash 0.027 0.026
[0.404] [0.442] [1.108] [1.064]
Cash 5.370 5.492 Capex 0.100* 0.101*
[0.406] [0.421] [1.666] [1.694]
Capex 151.636*** 153.866*** R&D 0.008 0.011
[5.587] [5.659] [0.098] [0.133]
R&D 207.408*** 203.313*** Firm Age -0.001*** -0.001***
[4.578] [4.514] [-5.761] [-5.796]
Firm Age 0.219*** 0.203*** Managerial Ability Score 0.053** 0.054**
[3.871] [3.548] [2.077] [2.101]
Managerial Ability Score -0.242 0.701 Intercept 0.349*** 0.364***
[-0.024] [0.071] [13.075] [13.545]







Table 14 General managerial skills and disclosure choices 
This table presents regressions of disclosure choices on general skills. Variable definitions are 
provided in the Appendix A. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in 




(1) (2) (3) (4)











GAI Dummy -0.031 -0.038
[-0.619] [-0.854]
Litigation -0.059 -0.059 0.033 0.034
[-1.008] [-1.011] [0.609] [0.632]
Analyst -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.001** 0.001*
[-2.868] [-2.875] [1.972] [1.962]
Sales 0.323*** 0.322*** 0.028 0.031
[5.434] [5.411] [0.600] [0.642]
Leverage 0.530*** 0.531*** -0.325* -0.326*
[2.809] [2.812] [-1.835] [-1.842]
Market to Book -0.124*** -0.123*** -0.032 -0.032
[-4.479] [-4.463] [-1.581] [-1.609]
ROA -1.459*** -1.463*** 1.197*** 1.219***
[-3.728] [-3.740] [3.903] [3.979]
Size -0.388*** -0.384*** 0.038 0.032
[-6.197] [-6.164] [0.725] [0.605]
Cash 0.915*** 0.913*** 0.161 0.157
[4.744] [4.731] [0.894] [0.872]
Capex 0.211 0.195 0.825* 0.850*
[0.330] [0.305] [1.689] [1.734]
Firm Age -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001
[-1.534] [-1.539] [-0.627] [-0.626]
R&D 0.968 1.001* 0.146 0.123
[1.626] [1.690] [0.280] [0.237]
Intercept -4.656*** -4.667*** 0.441*** 0.478***
[-7.365] [-7.379] [3.105] [3.437]
N 4,761 4,761 4,344 4,344
R
2 0.108 0.108 0.315 0.315
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Table 14 General managerial skills and disclosure choices 
This table presents regressions of disclosure choices on general skills. Variable definitions are 
provided in the Appendix A. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in 




(5) (6) (7) (8)











GAI Dummy -0.037 -0.017**
[-0.715] [-1.969]
Litigation -0.022 -0.022 -0.029*** -0.029***
[-0.354] [-0.352] [-2.722] [-2.696]
Analyst 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
[0.373] [0.381] [-0.748] [-0.772]
Sales 0.012 0.010 -0.008 -0.008
[0.215] [0.181] [-0.818] [-0.817]
Leverage -0.608*** -0.606*** -0.023 -0.024
[-2.755] [-2.751] [-0.642] [-0.652]
Market to Book -0.001 0.001 -0.009* -0.009*
[-0.017] [0.037] [-1.735] [-1.733]
ROA -0.222 -0.247 -0.287*** -0.285***
[-0.479] [-0.534] [-4.087] [-4.057]
Size 0.094 0.100 -0.001 -0.002
[1.465] [1.535] [-0.133] [-0.146]
Cash 0.339 0.337 -0.035 -0.036
[1.646] [1.635] [-0.810] [-0.847]
Capex 0.269 0.243 0.258** 0.258**
[0.404] [0.362] [2.272] [2.272]
Firm Age 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000
[1.440] [1.416] [0.948] [0.937]
R&D 0.597 0.639 -0.120 -0.116
[0.823] [0.880] [-1.024] [-0.983]
Intercept 2.543*** 2.532*** 0.853*** 0.862***
[11.789] [11.872] [4.771] [4.868]
N 1,872 1,872 5,036 5,036
R
2
0.247 0.247 0.060 0.060
69 
Table 15 Analyst characteristics  
This table reports the characteristics of analysts who follow the firms run by generalists. Panel A 
shows the summary statistics of analyst characteristics. Panel B examines what type of analysts 
are more likely to cover firms run by generalists. Variable definitions are provided in the 










Generalists Mean Standard Deviation
Frequency of Forecasts 10.26 7.91
Number of Firms Covered 16.6 8.8
Years as Analyst 7.96 5.34
Years Covering Firm 4.52 3.89
Broker Size 63.63 49.07
Specialists Mean Standard Deviation
Frequency of Forecasts 10.02 7.71
Number of Firms Covered 16.83 9.1
Years as Analyst 7.84 5.36
Years Covering Current Firm 4.2 3.6
Broker Size 59.63 48.02
Panel B
GAI Dummy
Frequency of Forecasts 0.001***
[3.374]
Number of Firms Covered -0.002***
[-7.708]
Years as Analyst -0.005***
[-8.615]











Table 16 Institutional investor characteristics  
This table reports the characteristics of institutional investors who hold the stocks of firms run by 
generalists. Panel A shows the summary statistics of the characteristics classified in Bushee 
(1998). Panel B examines what type of investors are more likely to cover firms run by generalists 
using a probit model. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix A. *, **, and *** indicate 

































Table 17 Effect of Regulation FD  
This table presents the tests of general managerial skills and the outcomes of external 
communication before and after the Reg FD. In Panel A, the dependent variable is difference 
between analyst forecasts and manager forecasts. In Panel B, the dependent variable is dispersion 
in analyst forecasts. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix A. Robust t-statistics 
adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance 




Panel A Panel B
Pre Reg FD Post Reg FD Pre Reg FD Post Reg FD
DIFF_AFMF DIFF_AFMF DISP DISP
GAI Dummy -0.153** -0.120* GAI Dummy -0.154* -0.065
[-1.966] [-1.759] [-1.903] [-1.419]
Management Forecast Error 0.535*** 0.561*** Analyst -0.002 -0.002***
[16.605] [20.526] [-1.414] [-3.470]
Analyst 0.002** 0.001 Leverage 1.953*** 1.779***
[2.280] [1.505] [9.280] [18.040]
Sales -0.042 -0.065** Market to Book 0.552** 0.148
[-1.134] [-2.012] [2.028] [1.001]
Leverage 0.325 -0.139 ROA -0.381*** -0.364***
[1.141] [-0.656] [-10.835] [-12.457]
Market to Book -0.142*** -0.091** Cash -0.650 -1.135***
[-4.636] [-2.519] [-0.936] [-2.789]
ROA -0.133 -1.880*** Capex 0.785* 0.925***
[-0.247] [-3.914] [1.770] [4.815]
Cash 0.009 0.218 Firm Age 0.344 1.289**
[0.026] [0.821] [0.384] [2.399]
Capex -0.460 0.295 R&D 1.243 1.213*
[-0.674] [0.345] [1.228] [1.906]
Firm Age -0.001 0.002 Loss 0.005*** 0.001
[-0.464] [1.256] [2.661] [0.948]
R&D 0.826 -0.897 Intercept -6.668*** -5.317***
[1.069] [-1.264] [-13.268] [-55.050]







Table 17 Effect of Regulation FD  
In Panel C, the dependent variable is dispersion in analyst following. In Panel D, the dependent 
variable is institutional ownership.  Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix A. Robust 
t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 




Panel C Panel D
Pre Reg FD Post Reg FD Pre Reg FD Post Reg FD
ANALYST ANALYST IOR IOR
GAI Dummy 2.435 4.453* GAI Dummy 0.032*** 0.013*
[1.429] [1.843] [3.993] [1.898]
Beta -2.207*** 1.300*** Sales -0.016** -0.007
[-7.005] [2.853] [-1.971] [-0.919]
Turnover 14.085*** 9.667*** Leverage 0.036 0.068**
[7.182] [6.834] [1.154] [2.401]
Change in Turnover -4.001*** -3.758*** Market to Book -0.003 -0.013***
[-3.601] [-2.778] [-1.018] [-2.922]
Leverage 17.431*** 5.322 ROA 0.449*** 0.456***
[2.680] [0.587] [8.792] [8.485]
Market to Book 10.048*** 5.391*** Size 0.040*** 0.022***
[8.681] [2.795] [4.622] [2.895]
ROA -61.800*** 32.639 Cash -0.007 0.057**
[-3.578] [1.557] [-0.211] [2.002]
Cash -28.682** 12.603 Capex 0.077 0.173**
[-2.337] [0.794] [1.074] [2.397]
Capex 113.151*** 175.502*** R&D 0.107 -0.026
[5.360] [4.496] [1.244] [-0.259]
R&D 88.405** 261.431*** Firm Age -0.000* -0.002***
[2.418] [4.510] [-1.814] [-7.229]
Firm Age 0.263*** 0.206*** Intercept 0.284*** 0.669***
[5.241] [2.949] [9.318] [21.264]








Table 18 Fixed effects regressions 
This table presents the tests of general managerial skills and the outcomes of external 
communication using fixed effects regressions. In Panel A, the dependent variable is difference 
between analyst and manager forecasts. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix A. 
Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** 





(1) (2) (3) (4)
CEO effect Firm effect CEO effect Firm effect
DIFF_AFMF DIFF_AFMF DIFF_AFMF DIFF_AFMF
General Ability Index -0.531*** -0.086*
[-2.906] [-1.782]
General Ability Index Dummy -0.746*** -0.341***
[-3.491] [-3.279]
Management 
Forecast Error 0.343*** 0.393*** 0.340*** 0.390***
[9.275] [11.975] [9.184] [11.973]
Analyst 0.002 0.003** 0.002 0.003**
[1.208] [2.499] [1.137] [2.360]
Sales 0.244 0.202 0.225 0.194
[0.771] [0.794] [0.719] [0.769]
Leverage 0.978* 0.774* 1.044** 0.787*
[1.898] [1.941] [2.012] [1.960]
Market to Book -0.130*** -0.128*** -0.122*** -0.124***
[-3.235] [-3.425] [-3.066] [-3.305]
ROA -2.842*** -2.388*** -2.845*** -2.387***
[-3.407] [-3.359] [-3.439] [-3.420]
Size -0.809*** -0.767*** -0.748*** -0.742***
[-3.149] [-3.475] [-2.933] [-3.378]
Cash -0.621 -0.426 -0.575 -0.424
[-1.312] [-1.043] [-1.223] [-1.041]
Capex -0.711 -0.890 -0.771 -0.826
[-0.523] [-0.801] [-0.566] [-0.741]
Firm Age 0.003 -0.001 0.006 0.000
[0.198] [-0.107] [0.360] [0.020]
R&D -1.314 -2.217 -1.155 -2.517
[-0.654] [-1.168] [-0.574] [-1.322]
Intercept 1.731 1.995* 1.694 1.941*
[1.193] [1.875] [1.146] [1.821]
N 2,416 2,416 2,416 2,416
R
2 0.769 0.706 0.771 0.709
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Table 18 Fixed effects regressions 
In Panel B, the dependent variable is dispersion in analyst forecasts. Variable definitions are 
provided in the Appendix A. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in 






(1) (2) (3) (4)
CEO effect Firm effect CEO effect Firm effect
DISP DISP DISP DISP
General Ability Index 0.022 0.026
[0.436] [1.320]
General Ability Index Dummy 0.059 0.027
[0.938] [0.727]
Analyst 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003***
[3.074] [6.064] [3.057] [6.039]
Leverage 1.006*** 1.037*** 1.007*** 1.039***
[12.529] [14.425] [12.542] [14.443]
Market to Book 0.707*** 0.647*** 0.705*** 0.646***
[3.867] [4.273] [3.849] [4.264]
ROA -0.206*** -0.219*** -0.206*** -0.219***
[-9.644] [-12.383] [-9.688] [-12.427]
Cash -1.896*** -1.980*** -1.892*** -1.992***
[-5.584] [-6.445] [-5.574] [-6.490]
Capex -0.114 -0.047 -0.112 -0.044
[-0.663] [-0.309] [-0.654] [-0.291]
Firm Age -0.724 -0.828* -0.716 -0.813*
[-1.325] [-1.703] [-1.307] [-1.673]
R&D 3.380*** 3.414*** 3.384*** 3.401***
[3.657] [4.504] [3.667] [4.466]
Loss -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.003
[-0.178] [0.570] [-0.170] [0.525]
Intercept -7.784*** -7.691*** -7.807*** -7.701***
[-16.665] [-20.989] [-16.606] [-20.937]
N 5,030 5,030 5,030 5,030
R
2 0.840 0.800 0.840 0.800
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Table 18 Fixed effects regressions 
In Panel C, the dependent variable is dispersion in analyst following. Variable definitions are 
provided in the Appendix A. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in 





(1) (2) (3) (4)
CEO effect Firm effect CEO effect Firm effect
ANALYST ANALYST ANALYST ANALYST
General Ability Index 3.679*** 0.421
[3.044] [0.973]
General Ability Index Dummy 6.817*** 1.037
[5.065] [1.340]
Beta 0.208 0.252* 0.199 0.253*
[1.400] [1.785] [1.337] [1.795]
Turnover 7.733*** 4.341*** 7.643*** 4.351***
[11.993] [8.607] [11.913] [8.631]
Change in Turnover -3.977*** -1.897*** -3.837*** -1.897***
[-7.368] [-3.789] [-7.057] [-3.786]
Leverage -2.660 -4.175 -3.237 -4.241
[-0.657] [-1.243] [-0.804] [-1.262]
Market to Book -0.979 -0.256 -0.953 -0.273
[-1.528] [-0.453] [-1.490] [-0.483]
ROA 24.173*** 35.909*** 23.440*** 36.013***
[3.006] [5.167] [2.899] [5.177]
Cash 7.297 -4.692 7.406 -4.689
[1.291] [-0.915] [1.296] [-0.913]
Capex -3.263 24.663** -4.978 24.510**
[-0.246] [2.044] [-0.377] [2.031]
R&D 81.532** 16.569 81.490** 16.820
[2.473] [0.595] [2.467] [0.604]
Firm Age 1.325*** -0.139* 1.324*** -0.138*
[7.454] [-1.755] [7.695] [-1.760]
Intercept 2.539 86.126*** -0.339 85.495***
[0.434] [19.892] [-0.061] [19.747]
N 7,938 7,938 7,938 7,938
R
2
0.839 0.789 0.839 0.789
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Table 18 Fixed effects regressions 
In Panel D, the dependent variable is institutional ownership.  Variable definitions are provided in 
the Appendix A. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. 





(1) (2) (3) (4)
CEO effect Firm effect CEO effect Firm effect
IOR IOR IOR IOR
General Ability Index 0.026*** 0.003
[6.228] [1.489]
General Ability Index Dummy 0.012** -0.001
[2.314] [-0.503]
Sales 0.003 -0.004 0.004 -0.004
[0.386] [-0.734] [0.584] [-0.743]
Leverage -0.087*** -0.038*** -0.089*** -0.038***
[-5.824] [-2.901] [-5.884] [-2.938]
Market to Book 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.010***
[6.821] [7.373] [6.893] [7.341]
ROA 0.133*** 0.191*** 0.122*** 0.189***
[5.429] [8.584] [5.000] [8.539]
Size 0.073*** 0.069*** 0.076*** 0.069***
[11.648] [12.164] [12.104] [12.200]
Cash 0.054*** 0.071*** 0.058*** 0.071***
[3.439] [4.971] [3.661] [4.974]
Capex -0.061 -0.038 -0.076* -0.040
[-1.542] [-1.006] [-1.911] [-1.054]
R&D -0.024 0.017 -0.024 0.015
[-0.347] [0.264] [-0.353] [0.243]
Firm Age 0.005*** 0.011*** 0.005*** 0.011***
[9.992] [21.779] [9.957] [21.815]
Constant 0.007 -0.077*** -0.029 -0.077***
[0.285] [-3.704] [-1.136] [-3.679]
Observations 18,720 18,720 18,732 18,732
R-squared 0.791 0.726 0.790 0.726
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Table 19 Effect of product market competition  
This table presents results for the sample split into high and low Industry Sale Herfindahl group 
based on the index above or below the yearly median. In Panel A, the dependent variable is 
difference between analyst forecasts and manager forecasts. In Panel B, the dependent variable is 
dispersion in analyst forecasts. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix A. Robust t-
statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 




Panel A Panel B
High Herfindahl Low Herfindahl High Herfindahl Low Herfindahl
DIFF_AFMF DIFF_AFMF DISP DISP
GAI Dummy -0.186** -0.043 GAI Dummy -0.036 -0.104*
[-2.253] [-0.622] [-0.569] [-1.831]
 Management Forecast Error 0.566*** 0.524*** Analyst -0.002*** -0.001**
[15.693] [18.511] [-2.875] [-2.078]
Analyst 0.004*** 0.002*** Loss 2.336*** 1.460***
[2.694] [2.896] [15.520] [13.504]
Sales 0.043 0.215*** Leverage 0.674*** -0.063
[0.586] [3.102] [3.154] [-0.370]
Leverage 0.214 0.380 Market to Book -0.428*** -0.357***
[0.669] [1.531] [-10.180] [-13.181]
Market to Book -0.120*** -0.107*** ROA -0.428 -1.523***
[-2.797] [-3.601] [-0.759] [-3.352]
ROA -1.011 -1.765*** Cash 1.899*** 0.637***
[-1.340] [-3.859] [6.661] [2.686]
Size -0.194** -0.298*** Capex 0.014 2.807***
[-2.126] [-4.029] [0.022] [3.589]
Cash 0.093 0.334 R&D -0.393 2.025***
[0.218] [1.343] [-0.238] [3.106]
Capex -1.587** 1.132 Firm Age 0.002 0.001
[-2.035] [1.370] [1.261] [0.722]
Firm Age 0.004* 0.001 Intercept -5.879*** -7.000***
[1.729] [0.569] [-28.215] [-10.794]









Table 19 Effect of product market competition  
In Panel C, the dependent variable is dispersion in analyst following. In Panel D, the dependent 
variable is institutional ownership. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix A. Robust t-
statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 




Panel C Panel D
High Herfindahl Low Herfindahl High Herfindahl Low Herfindahl
ANALYST ANALYST IOR IOR
GAI Dummy 5.932*** 2.689 GAI Dummy 0.030*** 0.016**
[2.795] [1.000] [3.758] [2.025]
Beta -0.256 0.270 Sales -0.001 -0.026***
[-0.561] [0.631] [-0.112] [-3.005]
Turnover 8.338*** 12.569*** Leverage 0.028 0.070**
[5.262] [5.670] [0.767] [2.255]
Change in Turnover -3.656*** -3.491** Market to Book -0.008 -0.009***
[-4.248] [-2.426] [-1.451] [-2.796]
Leverage 11.369 3.567 ROA 0.456*** 0.467***
[1.286] [0.353] [6.839] [9.080]
Market to Book 6.470*** 7.879*** Size 0.016 0.046***
[4.020] [4.652] [1.522] [5.700]
ROA 36.760** -3.469 Cash 0.027 0.022
[2.351] [-0.114] [0.622] [0.787]
Cash -27.462* 6.246 Capex 0.151* 0.015
[-1.756] [0.340] [1.819] [0.208]
Capex 151.661*** 126.082*** R&D -0.037 0.104
[5.160] [2.987] [-0.263] [1.139]
R&D -122.862** 242.690*** Firm Age -0.001*** -0.001***
[-1.973] [4.718] [-3.585] [-4.753]
Firm Age 0.216*** 0.254*** Intercept 0.360*** 0.348***
[3.459] [2.940] [9.187] [10.503]
Intercept -1.679 31.969*** N 8,279 10,453
[-0.325] [4.279] R
2 0.310 0.257
N 3,970 3,968
R
2 0.312 0.345
